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Information to Enrollees; Mandate a Grievance Procedure for 
Enrollees Denied a Claim; Bar Plans from Paying Physicians 
Who Give Less Than Appropriate Care or Penalizing Physicians 
Who Advocate Appropriate Care for Their Patients 
CODE SECTIONS: 
BILL NUMBER: 
ACT NUMBER: 
GEORGIA LAWS: 
SUMMARY: 
O.C.G.A. §§ 33-20A-1 to -10 (new), 33-21-1, -13 
(amended), -18.1 (new) 
HB 1338 
751 
1996 Ga. Laws 485 
This Act is known as the Patient Protection Act 
of 1996. The Act encourages physicians to 
advocate appropriate care for their patients. 
Under the Act, a managed care plan must 
obtain a certificate from the Commissioner of 
Insurance before offering coverage to State 
residents, and the Commissioner may terminate 
the certificate for violations. Mandatory 
standards for certification include disclosure to 
enrollees and applicants of the precise nature of 
services and benefits available under the plan, 
copayments, any reviews of care that could 
result in denial of coverage, the names of 
physicians who accept the coverage, a grievance 
procedure for denied claims and a summary of 
the outcomes of grievance procedures, the 
availability of emergency services, whether the 
plan restricts the availability of prescription 
drugs (referred to as a formulary restriction), 
and access to additional information about the 
plan. The plan must provide reasonably prompt 
care twenty-four hours a day, must pay for 
emergency services and out-of-area services, and 
must establish a quality assurance (QA) 
program. The QA program must, among other 
things, stress health outcomes, have written 
protocols, provide review by physicians, and 
detect underutilization and overutilization. The 
plan may not use financial incentives that 
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compensate a physician for providing less than 
appropriate care. Furthermore, a plan may not 
penalize a physician who discusses appropriate 
care with or on behalf of his patient. The plan 
must have procedures to safeguard patient 
privacy. The plan must provide, without prior 
authorization, for emergency services to 
stabilize a patient; the patient may not be 
transferred to another facility unless the 
treating physician certifies that the patient is 
stable. 
EFFECTIVE DATE: July 1, 1996 
History 
Managed care is a health insurance scheme that operates according 
to an entirely different paradigm from traditional indemnity health 
insurance. l Indemnity insurance, or fee-for-service insurance, allows an 
insured to choose essentially any doctor or hospital and pays usual, 
customary, and reasonable claims.2 Managed care provides for both 
payment and delivery of health services through contracts with selected 
doctors and hospitals (the pane!), and attempts to lower fees charged by 
the paneP The panel typically gives discounts to ensure a source of 
patients.4 
Although managed care was prompted as a way to capture savings 
through reduced premiums for the insured, whether and to what extent 
cost savings have been achieved is still unclear.5 Some studies have 
1. The Act defines 'managed care plan' as follows: 
rAJ major medical, hospitalization, or dental plan that provides for the 
financing and delivery of health care services to persons enrolled in such 
plan through: 
(A) Arrangements with selected providers to furnish health care 
services; 
(B) Explicit standards for the selection of participating providers; 
and 
(C) Cost savings for persons enrolled in the plan to use the 
participating providers and procedures provided for by the plan; 
provided, however, that the term 'managed care plan' does not 
apply to Chapter 9 of Title 34, relating to workers' compensation. 
O.C.G.A. § 33·20A-3(7) (Supp. 1996). 
2. Sana Loue, An Epidemiological Framework for the Formulation of Health 
Insurance, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 523, 527 (1993). 
3. The definition of "managed care plan" for purposes of the Act expressly 
includes cost savings. See supra note 1. 
4. Michael A. Hiltzik & David R. Olmos, A Mixed Diagnosis for HMOs. They 
Strongly Deny Rationing Care, But Times Study Finds They Withhold Some Services 
From Sicker Patients Solely Because of High Costs, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1995, at 1. 
5. Greg Scandlen, Has Managed Care 'Won'?, INvESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, July 26, 
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shown that after an initial savings in premiums when the insured 
switches to managed care, the rise in premiums will often be equal to 
or greater than the rise in the premiums of comparable indemnity 
insurance.6 Some of the problems for managed care companies have 
been caused by administrative costs.7 Furthermore, the salary 
structure in managed care plans is allegedly unusually top heavy 
compared to other industries.8 Some commentators have accused 
managed care plans of rationing medical care to achieve profits.9 
Public concern over the possibility that managed care plans may be 
denying medically necessary care has been reflected in a few high-
profile lawsuits. Recently in Georgia, for example, a court awarded a 
plaintiff $45 million from Kaiser Permanente.10 In that case, a child 
sustained severe injuries because of a delay after Kaiser instructed the 
mother to take him to a panel hospital forty-two miles away rather 
than to the nearest hospital.ll Similarly, a California court awarded a 
plaintiff with breast cancer $89 million ($12 million compensatory, $77 
million punitive) from Health Net because of bad faith refusal to pay 
for a necessary bone-marrow transplant.12 Another transplant denial 
case in California described in Time magazine, in which Health Net 
discouraged plan doctors from discussing a needed bone-marrow 
transplant with the patient,13 so impassioned one Georgia legislator14 
that he brought in copies of the article and distributed them to fellow 
1995, at A2. 
6. Id. 
7. John Merline, Payor Pay: Managed Care Will Not Save Medicare, But A Dose 
of Reality Might, NAT'L REv., May 29, 1995, at 45. 
8. Martin Dyckman, Comeuppance for HMOs Series, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 
2, 1996, at 13A. 
9. Hiltzik & Olmos, supra note 4; see also Statelines New York: Public Advocate's 
Report Blasts HMOs, AM. POL. NETWORK, Jan. 5, 1996, at 5 (espousing even more 
negative indictment of New York HMOs). 
10. Mark Silk, $45 Million Malpractice Verdict Fulton County Jury Award Against 
HMO Largest Ever in State, ATLANTA J. & CaNST., Feb. 4, 1995, at C10. 
11. Id. 
12. Punitive Damages Ordered in Case Against Health Net, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 
1993, at B5. 
13. Erik Larson, The Soul of an HMO: Managed Care is Certainly Bringing Down 
America's Medical Costs, But It is Also Raising the Question of Whether Patients, 
Especially Those With Severe Illnesses, Can Still Trust Their Doctors, TIME, Jan. 22, 
1996, at 44. 
14. Telephone Interview with Rep. Bart Ladd, House District No. 59 (Apr. 8, 1996) 
[hereinafter Ladd Interview). Representative Ladd introduced HB 1183, which became 
moot because its only two provisions-a physician anti-gag rule and a point-of-service 
option provision-became incorporated into HB 1338 and HB 1404, respectively. Id. 
He retained a keen interest in these bills during the session and stated thnt David 
Cook, Lobbyist, Medical Association of Georgia, "knew everything about HB 1338." Id. 
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committee members.15 Representative Ehrhart, a co-sponsor of HB 
1338, considered physician gagging highly objectionable.16 
Concern over these and other potential abuses of managed care have 
led several states to consider legislation to protect patients enrolled in 
managed care plans.17 Some believe the Georgia Patient Protection Act 
of 1996 is the most extensive of any of these efforts. IS 
HB 1338 
Before passage of the Act, the Commissioner of Insurance had 
regulatory powers over managed care plans.19 The Act greatly expands 
the scope of this power.20 Previously, the Commissioner could issue a 
certificate of authority21 t" a health care plan, allowing it to sell an 
insurance product, but the Commissioner was not empowered to 
withhold certificates for reasons that directly involved patient care.22 
For example, the Commissioner could authorize a certificate as long as 
the insurer would not create an "unnecessary duplication of similar 
services,"23 the methods of solicitation appeared fair and reasonable,24 
and the method of establishing rates was fair.25 The Commissioner 
could revoke a certificate if an insurer's financial condition was 
15. A Cure for Gagged Physicians, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 25, 1996, at A12. 
16. Telephone Interview with Rep. Earl Ehrhart, House District No. 36 (June 25, 
1996) [hereinafter Ehrhart Interview]. 
17. Telephone Interview with David Cook, Lobbyist, Medical Association of Georgia 
(Apr. 8, 1996) [hereinafter Cook Interview 1]. Mr. Cook was the principal author of 
HB 1338. Id. New Jersey, Oregon, and Texas are also considering patient-protection 
legislation and the American Medical Association has proposed model legislation. Id.; 
see ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-99-201 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1995). See generally Milton 
Friedman, A Way Out of Soviet·Style Health Care, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 1996, at 
A20. Friedman quotes the description in Alexander Solzhenitsyn's, The Cancer Ward, 
of the elderly Russian physician who had worked both in private practice before 1918 
and subsequently in the Soviet system. Id. The physician explained how under the 
"free" Soviet health system physicians were reduced to catching malingerers and 
frauds; the system made "doctor and patient as enemies." Id. Friedman points out 
that modem "health maintenance organizations and other forms of managed care" 
create a similar atmosphere of "depersonalized" care with "doctor and patient as 
enemies." Id. 
18. Cook Interview I, supra note 17. Cook believes, for example, that none of the 
bills being considered by other states address formulary restrictions. Id. 
19. 1976 Ga. Laws 1461, § 1, at 1476 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 33-20-9(a) (1992». 
20. See O.C.G.A. §§ 33-20A-1 to -10 (Supp. 1996). 
21. See 1976 Ga. Laws 1461, § 1, at 1476-78 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 33-20-9(a) 
(1992». 
22. See id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 33-20-9(a)(4) (1992». 
25. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 33-20-9(a)(5) (1992». 
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unsound26 or if an insurer compelled a claimant to accept less than the 
amount due.27 
In contrast, the Act establishes detailed standards, many directly 
affecting patient care, that a managed care plan must meet and 
continue to meet, before the Commissioner issues a certificate or re-
certifies the plan.26 Beyond the certificate requirements, managed care 
plans "may not use a financial incentive program that directly 
compensates a health care provider for ordering ... less than 
medically ... appropriate care ... ";29 may not prevent or discourage a 
physician from discussing medically appropriate care;30 must pay for 
all emergency care until the patient is stabilized;31 and must pay for 
medically necessary, non-formulary drugS.32 Importantly, the Act 
mandates that the Commissioner apply sanctions, including 
termination of the certificate, for any violation.33 
Physician Anti-Gag Rule 
As introduced, HB 1338 contained an "anti-gag" rule.34 The Senate 
Insurance and Labor Committee replaced this rule with very general 
language: "[n]o health care provider may be penalized for discussing 
medically necessary or appropriate health care with or on behalf of his 
or her patient."35 The Committee settled on this language because, as 
the Committee revised the anti-gag rule as introduced, the rule became 
so convoluted that eventually no one could understand it.36 
Consequently, the Committee simplified and shortened the rule so that 
its meaning would be unmistakable.37 Additionally, the preamble to 
the Act states that "it is the public policy of the State of Georgia that 
26. fd. at 1479 (codified at D.C.G.A. § 33-20-11(3) (1992». 
27. [d. at 1480 (codified at D.C.G.A. § 33-20-11(4) (1992». 
28. D.C.G.A. §§ 33-20A-4, -5 (Supp. 1996) 
29. [d. § 33-20A-6. 
30. [d. § 33-20A-7. 
31. [d. § 33-20A-9(1). 
32. [d. § 33-20A-9(2). 
33. [d. § 33-20A-4(c). 
34. HB 1338, as introduced, 1996 Ga. Gen. Assem. The original version protected a 
physician who advocated for medically appropriate health care for his or her patient 
from being terminated from the plan; also, the plan could not "otherwise penalize" 
the physician. [d. 
35. HB 1338 (SCS), 1996 Ga. Gen. Assem. Although Rep. Ehrhart would have 
preferred the "anti-gag" rule to specifY exactly what a managed care plan could or 
could not do and exactly what a physician could or could not say, he is satisfied that 
the language of the Act solves the problem. See Ehrhart Interview, supra note 16. 
36. Telephone Interview with David Cook, Lobbyist, Medical Association of Georgia 
(June 6, 1996) [hereinafter Cook Interview II]. Eventually, the rule grew to an entire 
legal size page. [d. 
37. [d. 
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physicians and health care providers be encouraged to advocate for 
medically appropriate health care for their patients."3B The broad 
language of the anti-gag rule and the preamble protects not only the 
physician who suggests an appropriate procedure to his or her own 
patient, for example, an oncologist who suggests a bone-marrow 
transplant to a patient with breast cancer, but also the physician who 
testifies as an expert on behalf of a patient who sues a managed care 
plan, for example, for failure to cover the cost of a recommended bone-
marrow transplant.39 
Some legislators believe the Act implies a private right of action for a 
physician who is penalized by a managed care plan for advocating on 
behalf of a patient.40 The Act's language that "[n]othing in this Code 
section shall be construed as precluding other remedies at law,"41 
which appears in the section giving the Commissioner the power to 
terminate a managed care plan's certificate for violations of the Act, 
may be persuasive on this issue.42 
Emergency Services 
As introduced, HB 1338 merely defined emergency services43 and 
mandated that a managed care plan provide for reimbursement for 
medically necessary emergency services not reasonably available 
through the plan.44 The Senate Insurance and Labor Committee 
further refined the definition of emergency services4S and restricted 
38. O.C.GA § 33-20A-2 (Supp. 1996). 
39. See Cook Interview I, supra note 17. A physician whose very livelihood may 
depend upon maintaining an economic relationship with a managed care plan would 
have a strong disincentive to testify against the plan. See Friedman, supra note 17. 
40. Representative Ladd believes that the Act implies a private right of action. See 
Ladd Interview, supra note 14. Representative Ehrhart said that though he did not 
deliberately seek to include a private right of action in the Act, he believes that the 
language of the Act probably does provide this right. Ehrhart Interview, supra note 
16. Mr. Cook said that he purposely used this language to imply a private right of 
action. Cook Interview II, supra note 36. 
Case law in Georgia is unsettled with respect to tests a court should use to 
imply a private right of action. In Adams v. City of Atlanta, 253 Ga. 581, 322 S.E.2d 
730 (1984), the Georgia Supreme Court permitted a private right of action under a 
Georgia statute by following the four-part test announced in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 
(1975). When the Georgia Supreme Court revisited this issue, however, it cited 
neither Adams nor Cort. Davis v. Findley, 262 Ga. 612, 422 S.E.2d 859 (1992). The 
United States Supreme Court has itself questioned, though not overruled, Cort. See 
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988). 
41. O.C.GA § 33-20A-4(c) (Supp. 1996). 
42. See id. 
43. HE 1338, as introduced, 1996 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
44. [d. 
45. HE 1338 (SCS), 1996 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
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the ability of a managed care plan to have an emergency patient 
transferred from a non-plan hospital to a plan hospital.46 
The definition of emergency services in HB 1338, as introduced, was 
similar to the language in the Act,47 but limited emergency services to 
those performed in a hospital emergency room.48 The broader language 
of the Act should include ambulance and other emergency 
transportation as well as emergency services rendered by a physician 
outside of an emergency room, such as in an urgent care facility or even 
a doctor's office.49 
The Act addresses a concern that plans were encouraging premature 
transfers of emergency patients from non-plan hospitals to plan 
hospitals before the patients were medically transferable50 The Act 
resolves this concern by requiring a managed care plan to reimburse for 
emergency services51 and to disclose to enrollees "what constitutes an 
emergency situation and what constitutes emergency services."52 
Further, the Act requires managed care plans to include provisions 
allowing examination, emergency treatment, stabilization, and transfer 
of patients without prospective authorization from the plans.53 
46. Id. 
47. O.C.GoA § 33-20A-3(2) (Supp. 1996). The Act defines "emergency services" or 
"emergency care" as 
Id. 
[T]hose health care services that are provided for a condition of recent 
onset and sufficient severity, including but not limited to severe pain, 
that would lead a prudent layperson, possessing an average knowledg':l of 
medicine and health, to believe that his or her condition, sickness, or 
injury is of such a nature that failure to obtain immediate medical care 
could result in: 
(A) Placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy; 
(B) Serious impairment to bodily functions; or 
(C) Serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. 
48. Compare O.C.GoA § 33-20A-3(2) (Supp. 1996) with HB 1338, as introduced, 
1996 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
49. See Cook Interview II, supra note 36. In drafting this section, Mr. Cook relied 
on emergency-room physicians to identify problems that patients enrolled in managed 
care plans encountered when seeking emergency services. Id. 
50. Cook Interview I, supra note 17. 
51. O.C.GoA § 33-20A-5(2)(C) (Supp. 1996) 
52. Id. § 33-20A-5(1)(A)(vii). 
53. See id. § 33-20A-9(1). The Act states: 
In the event that a patient seeks emergency services and if necessary in 
the opinion of the emergency health care provider responsible for the 
patient's emergency care and treatment and warranted by his or her 
evaluation, such emergency provider may initiate necessary intervention 
to stabilize the condition of the patient without seeking or receiving 
prospective authorization by the managed care entity or managed care 
plan. If in the opinion of the emergency health care provider, a patient's 
condition has stabilized and the emergency health care provider certifies 
that the patient can be transported to another facility without suffering 
7
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A related concern was that some HMOs were refusing to pay for 
emergency care rendered for conditions that retrospectively proved to be 
benign. 54 The Act addresses this concern by changing the standard for 
defining any emergency to that of the "prudent layperson.,,55 
Formulary Restrictions 
A standard approach to cost savings by managed care companies is 
the use of restricted drug formularies.56 This approach involves 
limiting the physician's prescription medication choices to the cheapest 
effective agents within a drug class.57 Though presumably designed to 
extract savings for the plan, restrictive formularies have subtle costs,58 
as well as the possibility for abuse.59 
The Act takes a two-pronged approach to prevent abuse: (1) it forces 
disclosure of a restrictive formulary60 and (2) it forces a procedure by 
Id. 
detrimental consequences or aggravating the patient's condition, the 
patient may be relocated to another facility which will provide continued 
care and treatment as necessary. 
54. Telephone Interview with David Cook, Lobbyist, Medical Association of Georgia 
(Nov. 8, 1996). Suppose, for example, that a man develops chest pain, fears he is 
having a heart attack, and goes to an emergency room. Suppose further that after a 
medical evaluation, his chest pain proves to be the result of indigestion rather than a 
heart attack. Before the Act, a reviewer for a managed care plan could deem the 
emergency-room visit to be unnecessary and controvert the claim. Id. Under the Act, 
so long as "a prudent layperson, possessing an average knowledge of medicine and 
health," believes that his or her condition requires emergency care, the condition will 
meet the definition of "emergency." O.C.G.A. § 33-20A-3(2) (Supp. 1996). 
55. O.C.G.A. § 33-20A-3(2) (Supp. 1996); see supra note 47. 
56. R. Taniguchi, Pharmacy Benefit Management Companies, 52 AM. J. HEALTH 
Sys. PHAR?l. 1915 (1995). 
57. Kevin J. Dunne & Ciara R. Ryan, How Management of Medical Costs is 
Revolutionizing the Drug Industry: Managed Pharmaceutical Care and Verticle 
Integration of Drug Makers and PBMs Promise Benefits, But Also Harbor Lurking 
Liability, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 177, 178 (1995). 
58. Ron Winslow, Limiting Drugs a Doctor Orders May Cost More, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 20, 1996, at Bl. Winslow reviewed a recent study of six HMOs that concluded 
that 
Id. 
in the HMO with the strictest formulary, patients got more prescriptions, 
had more visits to the doctor, more emergency-room care and higher 
hospital use than patients in the HMO that didn't use a formulary. 
Similarly, use of generic drugs was linked with higher overall use of 
prescriptions, as well as more office visits for patients being treated for 
high blood pressure, ear infections and arthritis. High generic-drug use 
among ulcer patients was associated with more hospital admissions. 
59. AMA House Scrutinizes Managed Care Prescription Policies, Decries Payments to 
Pharmacists for Switches, 52 AM. J. HEALTH SyS. PHAR?1. 1967 (1995). 
60. O.C.G.A. § 33-20A-5(1)(A)(ix) (Supp. 1996). Representative Ehrhart strongly 
supported the mandatory disclosure provisions of the Act. See Ehrhart Interview 
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which a patient can obtain a necessary, non-formulary drug.61 The 
disclosure prong mandates not only disclosure of the existence of the 
formulary, but also that enrollees and even prospective enrollees of the 
plan must be provided "a description of specific drug and therapeutic 
class restrictions."62 The procedure prong is uncomplicated.o3 The 
language does not specify that the physician must certify the 
ineffectiveness of the formulary drug or the adverse reaction; 
presumably the patient need only make the certification in good 
faith.64 
Quality Assurance Program 
The Act requires a managed care plan to have a Quality Assurance 
(QA) program in place and disclose the program to all enrollees and 
prospective enrollees.65 The QA program must contain specific 
requirements designed to ensure quality care to patients and must 
review utilization in a way that "stresses health outcomes,"66 provides 
supra, note 16. "What does an HMD have to hide?" Id. Representative Ehrhart 
wanted to guarantee that anyone purchasing a managed care plan would know 
exactly what he or she was getting. Id. 
61. D.C.GoA § 33-20A-9(2) (Supp. 1996). 
62. Id. § 33-20A-5(1)(A)(ix). 
63. D.C.GoA § 33-20A-9(2) outlines the procedure for obtaining non-formulary drugs: 
When a managed care plan uses a restrictive formulary for prescription 
drugs, such use shall include a written procedure whereby patients can 
obtain, without penalty and in a timely fashion, specific drugs and 
medications not included in the formulary when: 
(A) The formulary's equivalent has been ineffective in the 
treatment of the patient's disease or condition; or 
(B) The formulary's drug causes or is reasonably expected to cause 
adverse or harmful reactions in the patient. 
Id. § 33-20A-9(2). 
64. See Cook Interview II, supra note 36. Cook learned from other lobbyi'3ts of the 
study that showed that restricted formularies have unintended consequences. See 
Winslow, supra note 56. Additionally, a Senator told Cook of personal problems the 
Senator experienced when dealing with a restricted formulary. See Cook Interview II, 
supra note 36. Cook, therefore, included these provisions in the Act as a further 
effort to protect patients from the known problems of restricted formularies. Id. 
65. D.C.GoA § 33-20A-5(1)(A)(vi), (3) (Supp. 1996); see Cook Interview II, supra 
note 36. The Medical Association of Georgia received many complaints from 
physicians about managed care plans preventing physicians from delivering necessary 
care to patients. Cook Interview II, supra note 36. The quality assurance program, 
and in particular, the provision to detect underutilization, was designed to collect 
information about this problem. Id.; see also Ehrhart Interview, supra note 16. 
Representative Ehrhart received many similar constituent complaints. Id. Ehrhart 
pointed out that the American Medical Association's model act contained a quality 
assurance program. Id. 
66. D.C.GoA § 33-20A-5(3)(B)(i)(!) (Supp. 1996). 
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review by physicians,67 and "has mechanisms to detect both 
underutilization and overutilization of services."68 
The QA program must also establish and disclose a grievance 
procedure that "provides the enrollee with a prompt and meaningful 
hearing on the issue of denial, in whole or in part, of a health care 
treatment or service or claim therefor."69 The grievance procedure 
must meet detailed due process requirements.7o Furthermore, the plan 
must disclose the outcome of all grievances filed in the previous three 
years.71 
Disclosure Provisions 
In addition to the disclosure provisions already mentioned, managed 
care plans face substantial disclosure requirements to enrollees and 
prospective enrollees in order to obtain a certificate from the 
Commissioner.72 The disclosure requirements extend to individuals 
who request information and not merely to the individual's employer 
who may be paying the premiums.73 
The Act requires disclosure of services offered and limitations on 
services,74 "copayments [and] prior authorization ... that could result 
in the patient's being denied coverage,,,75 and potential liability for 
medical services obtained outside of the managed care plan.76 
Additionally, the plan must, upon request, provide a list of physicians 
and hospitals participating in the plan and disclose any limitation on 
available choices.77 The Act requires disclosure of limited utilization 
incentive plans78 and "[a] statement as to where and in what manner 
additional information is available."79 
67. [d. § 33-20A-5(3)(B)(i)(III). 
68. [d. § 33-20A-5(3)(B)(i)(V1). 
69. [d. § 33-20A-5(3)(B)(ii). 
70. [d. 
71. [d. § 33-20A-5(l)(A)(xii); see Cook Interview II, supra note 36. Cook said that 
grievance procedures were common in the various state patient-protection acts that he 
examined. Cook Interview II, supra note 36. He borrowed some of the best provisions 
from each of these acts in drafting HB 1338. [d. 
72. D.C.GoA § 33-20A-5 (Supp. 1996). 
73. [d. § 33-20A-5(1); see Ehrhart Interview, supra note 16. The disclosure 
provisions are in the Act as another protection for patients enrolled in managed care. 
See also Cook Interview II, supra note 36 (agreeing with Ehrhart). 
74. D.C.GoA § 33-20A-5(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 1996). 
75. [d. § 33-20A-5(l)(A)(U). 
76. [d. § 33-20A-5(1)(A)(ili)-(iv). 
77. [d. § 33-20A-5(l)(A)(v), (x). 
78. [d. § 33-20A-5(l)(A)(vili). 
79. [d. § 33-20A-5(l)(A)(xi). 
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Physician Incentives 
A managed care plan may not use financial incentives to induce a 
physician to provide less than appropriate care.SD This is another 
provision designed to counteract the allegedly core problem of managed 
care: the denial of coverage or treatment for medically necessary 
care.S1 This provision addresses concerns over the doctors', rather than 
the plans', incentives to underutilize services.B2 However, the Act does 
not prohibit capitation schemes.83 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
The Act requires a managed care plan to safeguard the privacy of 
patient information.54 Each managed care plan must also maintain 
accurate and timely records for its patients. 55 
Glenn L. Goodhart 
80. O.C.GA § 33-20A-6 (Supp. 1996); see Cook Interview IT, supra note 36. Cook 
was concerned that patients were unaware that managed care plans have given 
physicians financial incentives to reduce care given to patients. Cook Inu3rview II, 
supra note 36. 
81. See Cook Interview IT, supra note 36. 
82. See O.C.GA § 33-20A-6 (Supp. 1996). 
83. Id.; see Cook Interview II, supra note 36; see also Douglas G. Cave, Capitated 
Chronic Disease Management Programs: A New Market for Pharmaceutical Companies, 
11 BENEFITS Q. 6 (1995). A "capitation scheme" is one in which a physician is 
periodically reimbursed a flat fee per patient regardless of the amount and cost of 
care given to the patient. Cave, supra at 6-7. Any particular capitation scheme may 
cap some or all of these costs with the level of reimbursement varying per patient. 
Id. 
84. O.C.GA § 33-20A-8 (Supp. 1996); see Cook Interview IT, supra note 36. Cook 
was alert to increasing public concern about privacy in general and privacy of medical 
records specifically. Cook Interview IT, supra note 36. He believed that this provision 
would resonate with managed care plans and physicians. Id. 
85. O.C.GA § 30-20A-8 (Supp. 1996). 
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